University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Social Impact Research Experience (SIRE)

Wharton Undergraduate Research

4-2015

Actor-based incentives for the restriction of mobile payments in
developing countries
Dylan Adelman
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/sire
Part of the Business Commons

Adelman, Dylan, "Actor-based incentives for the restriction of mobile payments in developing countries"
(2015). Social Impact Research Experience (SIRE). 33.
https://repository.upenn.edu/sire/33

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/sire/33
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Actor-based incentives for the restriction of mobile payments in developing
countries
Abstract
Mobile phones promote financial inclusion in developing nations by enabling access to credit savings,
and transfer services. These payment systems rarely achieve nationwide usage that is sufficient for
network effects, a problem that existing literature attributed to exogenous factors such as regulations,
poverty, and infrastructure costs. This paper argues that banks, telecoms, and governments are
incentivized to inhibit the spread of mobile payments because the systems harm their institutional
stability. The paper presents theoretical and empirical scenarios in which each actor would be
incentivized to restrict mobile payments. The conclusion is that support for mobile payments is not
universal, and future endeavors must account for the incentives of relevant actors.

Keywords
mobile phones, economic development, incentives, poverty, Africa.

Disciplines
Business

This working paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/sire/33

Title: Actor-based incentives for the restriction of mobile payments in developing countries
Author: Dylan Adelman
Email: dylana@wharton.upenn.edu
Affiliation: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
Disciplines: Developmental Economics; Political Science
Abstract: Mobile phones promote financial inclusion in developing nations by enabling access to
credit savings, and transfer services. These payment systems rarely achieve nationwide usage that
is sufficient for network effects, a problem that existing literature attributed to exogenous factors
such as regulations, poverty, and infrastructure costs. This paper argues that banks, telecoms, and
governments are incentivized to inhibit the spread of mobile payments because the systems harm
their institutional stability. The paper presents theoretical and empirical scenarios in which each
actor would be incentivized to restrict mobile payments. The conclusion is that support for mobile
payments is not universal, and future endeavors must account for the incentives of relevant actors.
Key words: mobile phones; economic development; incentives; poverty; Africa.

Actor-based incentives for the
restriction of mobile payments
in developing countries

Dylan Adelman | December 2015
The University of Pennsylvania

1

Mobile phones are a deus ex machina for the plights of the bottom billion. From
Guadalajara to Gujarat, the mobile phone has jumpstarted an unforeseen communications
revolution for those living on less than $2.00 daily. Nearly 650 million adults in subSaharan Africa, about 70% of the population, have access to a mobile phone—more than
the population of North America.1 The adoption rates for mobile phones have shot from
10% to 90% in parts of Africa and Latin America within the last decade, rivaling the
usage numbers of developed nations.2 For many, accessing a mobile phone is easier than
accessing a toilet.
Phones are useful for more than just placing calls, and communicative benefits
have proliferated. Residents of Kathmandu can access the latest data on Himalayan
earthquakes. 3 Tanzanian farmers can receive daily texts updates on the spot price for
coffee in Dar es Salaam.4 In Ghana, users of the health application mPedigree can check
for counterfeit pharmaceuticals.5 Economic benefits also abound: studies have found that
10 additional mobile phones per 100 people in a developing country will raise GDP by as
much as 1.2%.6 Mobile phones also play a critical role in promoting financial inclusion
by obviating the need for physical banks. Although 85% of sub-Saharan Africa lacks
access to a formal savings account, mobile banking has informally filled the void by
enabling millions to access services for savings, loans, transfers, and financial planning.7
Of these services, transfers may prove the most consequential. Mobile payments,
as transfers are commonly known, enable the virtual exchange of units of value from one
phone to another. The units of value are legally mandated to maintain 1:1 parity with the
national currency, and the exchange is usually controlled by a telecom (sometimes in
conjunction with a bank). Mobile payments services worldwide numbered 263 by August
2015, with dozens more in trial phase.8
Arguably the most famous mobile payments service is Kenya’s M-Pesa (“mobile
money” in Swahili). Started in 2007 by telecom Safaricom, this creatively named service
annually handles transactions amounting to 60% of Kenya’s GDP.9 The most immediate
benefit of mobile payments is a reduction in transfer costs: the cost to send 1000 Kenyan
Shillings ($15 USD) from Nairobi to Turkana (from central to northwestern Kenya) via
M-Pesa is just 7% of the cost to send money via matatu buses, the traditional method of
informal money transfers. 10 M-Pesa saves users an average of $3 per transaction,
remarkable when one considers that Kenya’s per-capita GDP is $1358.11 With time, the
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reduced friction in payments has important microeconomic effects: income levels of
households using M-Pesa rose by as much as 30% within three years of adoption, relative
to peers.12
Mobile payments systems worldwide, 2005-2015
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The counterrevolution
The universal recognition of mobile payments as crucial to the war on poverty has
not translated to universal success. The omnipresent example of M-Pesa belies the reality
that only 21 mobile payments services claim greater than one million users. Despite the
ubiquity of mobile payments, less than 1 in 10 sub-Saharan Africans are active users of
mobile payments—a ratio skewed upward by the success of Kenya and Tanzania.13 If
mobile transfers are crucial to alleviate poverty, then why does the probability of success
for a typical mobile payments system rival the acceptance rate of Harvard College?
The existing literature explains this dissonance in several ways. First, regulatory
barriers related to international AML/CTF/KYC14 requirements hamper telecoms’ ability
to sign up new users because the world’s poorest lack the necessary paperwork for selfidentification.15,16 Second, the abjectly poor are uninterested in mobile money because of
a predilection for cash, a misunderstanding of transfers, or a perceived lack of utility from
its usage.17 Third, the cost of physical infrastructure related to mobile transfers (such as
12
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agent networks that handle conversion between physical and electronic money) offset
expected returns, a cost compounded by the dispersed nature of rural populations.18
While important, these factors do not explain the extent of this failure because of
their passivity. That is, these factors are non-incentivized and exogenous barriers that can
be overcome by parties interested in the success of mobile payments. Regulations can be
streamlined under governments wishing to promote mobile payments, as demonstrated by
Kenya and Tanzania. The abject poor can learn the benefits of mobile transfers with
targeted education programs, as demonstrated by successful programs in Zambia and
Mexico.19,20 Infrastructure barriers are a red herring: telecoms can leverage pre-existing
airtime distribution networks for the provision of mobile payments, as demonstrated by
Safaricom in its usage of pre-existing airtime agents for the M-Pesa rollout. 21 , 22 By
emphasizing passive factors, the existing literature assumes that all major actors—banks,
telecoms, and governments—are incentivized to foment the success of mobile payments,
and that failure is exogenous to their decisions. That assumption is false.
This paper argues that banks, telecoms, and governments are incentivized to
actively inhibit the success of mobile payments. The paper is divided into sections based
on the relevant actors, providing theoretical and empirical warrants for actors’ incentives
to restrict the dispersion of mobile payments systems. This thesis is entirely novel in the
existing literature on mobile payments, likely explained by the conflation of benefits for
users and benefits for providers. Existing literature does not fully recognize that relevant
actors do not always benefit from increased mobile payments adoption. This paper aims
to widen the circle of academic discussion on mobile payments to include actor-based
incentives, necessary for a more holistic understanding of factors undergirding the future
of mobile payments in developing countries.
The incumbent
Payments are the lifeblood of banks. Between interchange fees and inter-account
transfers, payments netted $1.3 trillion USD for banks worldwide in 2012—an estimated
34% of global profits. Banks fear a future in which payments are not tied to formal bank
accounts, as this would eliminate the opportunity for lucrative processing fees. Banks see
this future unfolding in real time: in 2012 alone, mobile money subscribers in Uganda
tripled from 2.9 million to 8.9 million as total bank accounts sat stagnant at 4.9 million.
At least a dozen African countries, from Cameroon to Zambia, have more mobile money
users than bank account holders. 23 In the event that automatic clearinghouse (ACH)
systems for the processing of formal money transfers are outmoded by mobile payments,
many banks will be relegated to the low-margin and commoditized provision of loans.
Banks cannot capture the nascent market for mobile payments, as these systems
are squarely in the domain of telecoms. Telecoms are the natural providers of mobile
18
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payments services because they own the phone networks on which the transfers function.
Compounding this prima facie uphill battle is the advantage that telecoms gain from preexisting airtime distribution networks: the small shops that have sold pre-paid minutes to
mobile phone users for years can be converted to mobile money agents with minimal
incremental expenditures. Safaricom converted 22,000 airtime distributors into mobile
money agents prior to the launch of M-Pesa, juxtaposed against the 4,000 bank branches
among all Kenyan banks at this time.24 Telecoms derive a third advantage from lighter
regulations governing airtime agents relative to traditional bank branches, meaning that
costs for new bank branches surpass those of similarly functional telecom agents.25
Agents and bank branches per 100,000 adults, select countries
Country
Bangladesh
Cote d'Ivoire
Dem. Rep. of Congo
Haiti
India
Kenya
Madagascar
Mexico
Nigeria
Pakistan
Philippines
Rwanda
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Uganda
Zimbabwe

Banks
8.1
4.6
4.6
2.7
11.4
5.5
1.7
14.5
5.8
9
8.1
76
10.4
17.5
2.2
2.6
7.1

Agents
508.3
107.3
88.1
21.6
18.3
484.6
34.3
32.6
36.5
149.8
39.4
212.2
10.6
114
564.6
276.2
80.5

Checkmate on the economic chessboard leaves banks with little recourse but to
leverage regulatory channels against telecoms. In 2013, the Bankers Association of
Zimbabwe successfully lobbied the central bank for a 5% fee increase on each mobile
money transaction run by telecoms like Econet Wireless. This doubling of per-transfer
costs likely served little purpose beyond discouraging the usage of mobile payments.26
Banks pressure regulators to require telecoms to partner with banks on the provision of
mobile payments, claiming (perhaps fairly) that telecoms lack the expertise necessary for

24
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taking deposits. This has proven successful in some instances, with governments such as
Uganda and Nigeria drafting legislation aiming to formally require these partnerships.27,28
Banks may be defending themselves by lowering the utility that individuals can
derive from adopting mobile payments. Increasing access to formal banking services is
one method to achieve this end, as the presence of a large banked population frequently
suffocates mobile payments. The formally banked population of South Africa increased
from 46% to 75% during 2004-2014, driven by a multi-bank partnership that sought to
provide low-cost Mzansi bank accounts to the rural poor.29 During that time, M-Pesa
twice failed to enter the South African mobile transfers market despite skyrocketing
growth in Kenya and Tanzania. Across the developing world, countries with higher levels
of formally banked citizens exhibit diminishing success for mobile payments.30
Financial services companies, which benefit from the success of banks, have also
entered this fray. MasterCard works with Nigeria’s government to issue national IDs that
double as prepaid bank cards, an effort meant to increase formal financial services among
the world’s poorest.31 If the purpose of mobile payments is to provide financial inclusion
for those excluded from the traditional banking system, then formally banking excluded
citizens reduces much of this demand. Smaller banks that cannot face the high costs of
new infrastructure will not pursue this option, but banks with sufficient infrastructure that
have, until now, chosen to exclude the poorest populations (due to low transaction
volumes) may see low-cost bank accounts as sufficient for profitability. This logic of
mutual exclusivity explains the low usage of mobile payments in the developed world: if
users have access to formal financial services, then informal services may not generate
sufficient incremental utility to justify adoption.
Banks will not disappear. Mobile payments may supplant the role of transfers, but
banks still offer beneficial services that require ample capital. Telecoms will likely not be
financing mortgages or offering car loans in the near future, and in-person financial help
will always trump mobile-based financial advisory services. But assuming that banks will
accept relegation to the low-margin provision of loans is wishful thinking. Hannibal ad
portas, and banks will not lose business to mobile payments without a protracted fight.
The disruptor
Telecoms enable mobile payments, supplying the services via pre-existing airtime
networks. Airtime networks are common in developing countries because prepaid phones
are more popular than expensive monthly contacts; 90% of mobile phones in sub-Saharan
Africa are pay-as-you-go.32 Airtime distributors are generally local shops that sell airtime
alongside other basic convenience items. Before the existence of mobile money, airtime
27
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served a secondary and unofficial role as a means of transferring value: since all mobile
phones required airtime, top-up minutes could function as a de-facto currency with
relatively consistent value across a country.33 This functionality still exists. Nigerians in
Lagos can text airtime codes to family members in Kano, who either redeem the airtime
for minutes or sell the airtime codes back to an airtime agent at a slight discount; selling
airtime back to the airtime agents allows one to cheaply cash out. Airtime transfers are
immensely profitable for telecoms: airtime is a currency produced at nearly zero cost,
then exchanged for real currency that flows directly to the bank’s bottom line.34,35
Telecoms will favor mobile money if revenues exceed costs. Theory dictates that
mobile money transactions are profitable because banks can charge small fees on each
transfer; research has found that mobile money can be profitable for near-monopolistic
providers.36 Proponents of this analysis rightfully account for higher initial and recurring
costs, such as costs of agent conversion and cost of AML/CTF/KYC compliance, which
arise with the adoption of mobile payments systems. However, this analysis misses
revenue cannibalization: mobile payments supplant more profitable airtime channels.
Mobile money causes a direct loss of revenue from airtime transfers because consumers
will not use both: mobile money offers consumers marginal benefits due to regulationguaranteed parity to the national currency.37 Mobile money threatens the more profitable
revenue stream of airtime transfers, and telecoms are thus incentivized to actively inhibit
this threat.
Regulations threaten telecom profitability with requirements for telecom-bank
partnerships. As noted above, these requirements arise when banks lobby the government
about what constitutes a deposit, as deposit acceptance is usually the dominion of banks.
South Africa broadly defines deposit acceptance as any movement of funds, effectively
mandating bank participation. 38 In contrast, Kenya considers mobile money a deposit
only when the telecom earns interest on the electronic currency, allowing Safaricom to
operate sans heavy restrictions. When banks lobby to change this definition, telecom
profits suffer: the aforementioned case of Econet in Zimbabwe resulted in a push “to
force Econet to open up bank participation.”39 This threat varies from country to country,
but can incentivize telecoms to preemptively suffocate nascent mobile payments systems.
Regulations further harm telecom profitability via requirements for inter-telecom
agent interoperability. Agent networks are a major competitive advantage for telecoms:
Safaricom achieved early dominance with M-Pesa largely thanks to its network of 22,000
agents (since expanded more than four-fold). Interoperability levels the playing field by
making agent networks a public good for all telecoms, regardless of size. This creates a
33
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free-rider problem, 40 since a small telecom could compete with Safaricom on mobile
payments without up-front investment in an agent network—after all, Safaricom has
already done the heavy lifting.41
These requirements are not fictitious: in July 2014, the Competition Authority of
Kenya (CAK) forced Safaricom to open its network of 85,000 agents to competitors after
successful lobbying by rival Airtel.42 Safaricom is a near-monopoly in Kenyan payments
and is unlikely to change its stance on M-Pesa due to this regulation. Nonetheless, the
regulation is a warning for telecoms with more nascent mobile payments systems:
Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa, and multiple other nations have seen pushes for agent
interoperability. If telecoms believe that regulations will force the sharing of expensive
agent networks with smaller rivals, they may calculate that this is a losing operation and
be incentivized to halt the progression of mobile payments.43

SMS usage before and after interoperability, select countries
Country

Australia
U.K.
Portugal

Interoperability
established

Apr. 2000
Apr. 1999
Feb. 2000

Pre-interoperability
usage (mil/month)

50
52
47

Post-interoperability
usage (mil/month)

500
180
162

One-year
increase

1350%
700%
368%

Opposition to interoperability is problematic for the success of mobile payments.
The high degree of network effects required for mobile payments means that, whenever
monopolistic dominance is not present, telecoms must connect their systems in order to
achieve sufficient scale.44 The early history of text messages in developed countries gives
credence to this, as various countries experienced exponential growth in SMS usage
directly after implementing network interoperability.45 When interoperability regulations
tip the scales against profitability for telecoms, rationality dictates that telecoms will not
choose to expand mobile payments. Compound this with the cannibalization of airtime
revenues, and the incentives of telecoms will often align against mobile payments.
The arbiter
Political theory asserts that governments should favor mobile money. If the state
exists to serve its citizens, then the welfare enabled by financial and communicative gains
provides ample incentives for governments to back this development. State support is the
most important factor for the success of mobile payments because the state can shift the
incentives of banks and telecoms to favor its emergence; for example, subsidies for firstmovers on infrastructure and streamlining AML/CTF/KYC requirements might alter the
40
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cost-benefit analysis for many telecoms. Kenya, Tanzania, and India are evidence of this
possibility. However, state support is not the norm. Governments believe that the benefits
of mobile money are negated by the specter of macroeconomic instability.
Governments fear the loss of seigniorage revenues. Seigniorage results from the
central bank profiting on the difference between interest receipts on securities acquired
from banks in exchange for newly printed currency, and the production costs for the new
currency. These revenues are an important source of risk-free profits for the government,
but the power to extract seigniorage is dependent on control over the unit of exchange. If
citizens choose to use the mobile money instead of the legal tender, then printed currency
will not be loanable to consumers (they will not accept it). Banks will not accept money
that cannot be loaned for profits, and seigniorage will become untenable.46
Seigniorage revenues as % of GDP in 2014, select countries47
Country
Colombia
Kenya
Mozambique
Nigeria
Paraguay
Sierra Leone
Serbia
Thailand
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia

Seigniorage
1.08%
1.69%
3.67%
0.87%
3.44%
2.70%
2.39%
0.71%
1.52%
2.51%
0.36%

Governments with higher seigniorage revenues as a percentage of GDP appear to
have less successful mobile payments systems relative to peers, although further analysis
is difficult due to constraints on seigniorage data. 48 The general threat of losing
seigniorage is nonetheless omnipresent: without seigniorage, the GDP of some countries
would fall as much as 0.7%.49 Even if states can offset revenue losses via new taxes on
mobile money, the loss of seigniorage still induces anxiety because the method functions
as a last resort for revenue extraction via a de-facto inflation tax.
Governments also fear debasement of the legal tender caused by competition with
mobile money to be the dominant unit of exchange. If the state does not monopolize the
unit of exchange, then monetary policy is ineffective.50 The central bank cannot control
46
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47
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48
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49
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50
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the money supply to influence the price level because consumption is no longer driven by
supply and demand of legal tender, but rather of the competing electronic currency. For
this reason, every state requires a 1:1 peg between mobile money and legal tender: if the
electronic currency is fixed at the value of the national currency, then no fluctuations are
possible and the electronic currency is a functional extension of the legal tender.
These regulations fail when parity is (illegally) eliminated. In 2013, the Ugandan
Anti-Corruption Court issued fines to MTN Group for illegally generating 146 billion
UGX (50 million USD) in electronic currency not backed by any legal tender, which was
then cashed out by conspiring bankers. Reflecting on MTN’s ability to produce its own
shillings, one observer noted that the stolen money was “printed by MTN itself.”51 This
situation is not unique: Rwanda has witnessed similar fabrication by telecom Tigo, which
generated 495 million francs (170,000 USD) without physical backing in 2014.52 Vigilant
monitoring of telecoms can mitigate this threat, but states must live with the fear that
illegal float generation could kill trust in the legal tender and cause rampant inflation.
Unregulated payments systems also threaten currency parity. Bitcoin is the most
famous example of an unregulated currency, and its near-global condemnation by states
is widely attributed to government fears of a competing currency.53 Another example is
airtime, which functions as a unit of exchange and has value derived from its local supply
and demand. The best glimpse into state fears of mobile money is provided by QQ coin,
an electronic currency developed by Chinese firm Tencent.54 The currency was created as
an online payment system for electronic greeting cards, virtual games, and software, but
grew so powerful that one Chinese official claimed, “QQ coin is challenging the status of
the Renminbi [Yuan] as the only legitimate currency in China.” The Chinese government
is now restricting issuance of QQ coins by Tencent, and is cracking down on vendors that
accept the currency in lieu of legal tender.55
These scenarios threaten central banks. The primary function of a central bank is
to prevent price indeterminacy, which leads to inflation when there is no mechanism to
tie down the price level. Central banks traditionally tie down the price level using shortterm interest rates that prevent currency oversupply, but mobile money threatens this
dynamic since the short-term interest rate cannot be controlled when the unit of exchange
is no longer the legal tender.56 If the central bank wishes to create liquidity for another
bank, it cannot meet this demand with “a stroke of the pen.” The central bank will instead
need to borrow the mobile currency using collateral, and then lend the mobile currency to
the commercial bank.
One crucial problem arises with collateral: it is not infinite, and will require the
51
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central bank to hold liquid securities purchased on the market.57 Even more important is
that collateral creates an arbitrage opportunity for commercial banks. Rising interest rates
on mobile money require the central bank to borrow money at that higher rate, but still
lend it back to other banks at a lower-than-market rate (the desired level) in order to
lower rates. The result is unavoidable: commercial banks will borrow from the central
bank at the desired rate and lend back the same money back to the central bank at the
market rate; this will produce unlimited gains for banks and correspondingly unlimited
losses for the central bank. Lacking a monopoly on liquidity generation, the central bank
loses its ability to reliably control short-term rates.58
Governments recognize the benefits of mobile payments for poverty alleviation,
but also recognize the threat of adverse macroeconomic outcomes. Governments that rely
on seigniorage revenues or fear that 1:1 currency pegs will be difficult to maintain will
likely see long-term risks that cannot justify microeconomic advances. The state faces a
Collingridge dilemma in that it must restrict mobile payments systems while they are still
nascent.59 Until the link to the macroeconomic risks can be controlled, states will often be
incentivized to inhibit the spread of mobile payments.
The groundswell
The future of the world’s poorest citizens is contingent on the spread of mobile
payments. Lower transaction costs, faster remittances, and access to financial services are
all necessary conditions for the end of poverty. Successful systems can alter the national
economy of the host country: $40 billion USD flowed through M-Pesa in 2013, compared
to $27 billion in mobile transfers handled by PayPal worldwide in that same time.60 The
dominance that mobile payments can achieve often threatens its own success, since
critical actors view this growth as a risk to the stable status quo. For the banks, telecoms,
and governments that dictate the emergence of mobile payments, the benefits to citizens
do not outweigh the costs to their respective institutions.
To be certain, each institution has myriad incentives both for and against mobile
payments. These incentives will vary for each actor. M-Pesa is not the same as Econet or
Airtel, and Zimbabwe is not the same as Zambia. Lex parsimoniae will fail in some cases,
and policymakers must be careful not to cut their throats on Occam’s razor. The common
incentives that undergird decision-making for each actor nonetheless provide a guide for
future research. Resolution may require a deus ex machina on par with mobile phones.
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